The Reservation Wage under CARA and Limited Borrowing by Bauer, Christian
Christian Bauer:
The Reservation Wage under CARA and Limited
Borrowing
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2009-8
Department of Economics
University of Munich
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10291/
The Reservation Wage under CARA and Limited Borrowing
Christian Bauer∗
A continuous-time sequential job search model with savings and CARA preferences is solved analytically
without resorting to unlimited borrowing and real-valued consumption. I isolate the effects of limited borrowing
and nonnegative consumption as well as risk-aversion on the reservation wage by using a system of ordinary
differential equations.
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1 Introduction
Motivated by considerable academic and popular interest in wealth-dependent unemployment policies,
I study the impact of a borrowing limit on the optimal behavior of a risk-averse worker in a continuous-
time sequential job search model with savings. Deviating from expected income maximization makes
it difficult to characterize optimal consumption and the reservation wage analytically in this environ-
ment. Recent research employs a very specific set of assumptions: with constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA), unlimited borrowing, and no nonnegativity constraint on consumption, a closed-form solu-
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tion exists (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999, Shimer and Werning, 2007, 2008). This solution
includes the following properties: wealth enters consumption linearly, wealth does not affect the reser-
vation wage, and wealth and consumption fall below any real number with positive probability. In
this paper, I solve the model without imposing a linear solution by using a two-dimensional system of
ordinary differential equations. It then is possible to analytically dissect the effects of lower bounds on
wealth and consumption as well as risk-aversion on optimal consumption and the reservation wage.
Limited borrowing increases the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth as wealth declines,
thereby causing a falling sequence of reservation wages over the unemployment spell.
2 Model and Solution
Consider a continuous-time partial equilibrium model of sequential job search with savings. An un-
employed worker receives job offers with random wage draws w at Poisson rate α.1 There is no job
separation and no on-the-job search. The individual maximizes her expected lifetime utility at time t,
U(t) = Et
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)u (c(τ))dτ, (1)
where u (c) = −e−γc is the instantaneous utility from consumption c. The discount rate ρ equals the
uniform interest rate on savings and debt, r. The unemployed individual receives constant benefits b.
Using consumption as the nume´raire, her asset holdings evolve according to
a˙u = ra+ b− cu. (2)
When employed, the worker lives in a stationary world. Hence, ce = ra+ w, a˙e = 0, and the value of
being employed is V e(w, a) = u(c
e(w,a))
r (see Appendix 4.A). When unemployed, the worker chooses
consumption and a reservation wage to maximize (1) subject to (2) and a no-Ponzi game condition
1Under CARA, recall of offers is not optimal and can be ignored.
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that limits the growth rate of debt to r (at this stage a, c ∈ R).
Deterministic Wage Offer
Suppose that there is only a single deterministic wage offer w. Before turning to the general solution,
I follow Shimer and Werning (2008) and derive a closed-form solution by going through a verification
theorem (cf. Merton, 1969, 1971, among others). If an optimal Markov control exists, the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is ρV u (a) = maxcu [u (cu) + (ra+ b− cu)V u′ (a)], where V u (a) is
the value of being unemployed when holding a units of wealth. The first order condition (f.o.c.) for
consumption, u′ (cu) = V u′ (a), defines the policy function cu = cu (a). We easily verify that the linear
guesses (g for guess and the δi’s are constants) cug = δ0a + δ1 and V
u
g (a) = δ2u(c
u
g ) satisfy both the
f.o.c. and the HJB equation if δ0 = 1δ2 = r and δ1 solves (b− δ1)
γr
α = e
−γ(w−δ1)− 1, which determines
a unique b < δ?1 < w.
2 We will see below that δ?1 , i.e. the fraction of labor income used to finance
consumption, is equal to the reservation wage in the case where wages are drawn from a distribution
and there is no lower bound on wealth and consumption. This linear solution (which e.g. corresponds to
Shimer and Werning, 2008, without a wage distribution) implies a˙u = ra+ b− (ra+ δ?1) = b− δ?1 < 0.
Wealth falls during the unemployment spell and consumption declines along with it. Consumption
becomes negative at a = − δ?1r . If we impose ad hoc that consumption must be nonnegative, debt still
continues to grow if it reaches δ
?
1
r (if c
u = 0, a˙u = ra + b < 0 for a < − br ). Debt exceeds any real
number with positive probability.
We now turn to the general solution. That is, we describe the optimal behavior of an unemployed
worker by a two-dimensional system of differential equations. The first equation is given by the law of
2The left hand side falls in δ1, intersecting the horizontal axis at δ1 = b from above. The right hand side is monotonically
increasing in δ1, equals e
−γw at δ1 = 0, and intersects the horizontal axis at δ1 = w from below.
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Figure 1: Consumption and Wealth Dynamics
motion for wealth in (2). The second equation is given by the evolution of optimal consumption (see
Appendix 4.B):
c˙u = −α
γ
[1 + u (ra+ w − cu)] . (3)
The dynamics of the system are illustrated in Figure 1. Wealth is constant on ζa (a) ≡ ra + b.
Consumption is constant on ζc (a) ≡ ra + w and on ζa (a). Consumption and wealth diverge from
ζc and ζa, respectively. Hence, the optimal path lies between ζa (a) and ζc (a) (consumption is
a normal good).3 The closed-form solution above is the trajectory consistent with the terminal
condition cu(− δ?1r ) = 0. The dashed line depicts the solution including a nonnegativity constraint on
consumption. Now suppose that wealth must not fall below some lower bound a¯. Such a borrowing
limit provides a globally saddle-path stable steady state at (c, a) = (ζa (a¯) , a¯). The policy function
must then be strictly increasing and strictly concave in wealth, see Figure 1 (where a¯ ≡ − br ). Given
initial asset holdings a (0) ≥ a¯, consumption starts on this trajectory and declines towards the steady
state. If the unemployed does not leave unemployment, her consumption level reaches ζa (a¯) (0 if
a¯ = − br ) in finite time, and then remains constant until she finds a job. Intuitively, limited borrowing
rules out debt levels which are implied by a linear solution while leaving consumption of very wealthy
3Above ζc (a) , c
u →∞ while a→ −∞. Below ζa (a), cu → −∞ while a→∞. Neither case can be part of a feasible
optimal program.
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individuals virtually unaffected.
Random Wage Offers
With this background, consider wage offers drawn from a distribution F (w) with support [0,∞)
and F ′ (w) > 0 for some w > 0. This gives rise to a reservation wage w¯ that leaves the individ-
ual indifferent between accepting the job and remaining unemployed: V e (a, w¯) ≡ V u (a). Implicit
differentiation using V e (a,w) = u(ra+w)r (w ≥ w¯) and V u′ (a) = u′ (cu(a)) shows
dw¯
da
=
[
u′ (cu (a))
u′ (ce (a, w¯))
− 1
]
r. (4)
The reservation wage is independent of wealth if cu(a) = ce(a, w¯) and increasing in wealth if
cu(a) < ce(a, w¯). If the model is solved without lower bounds on wealth and consumption, guess-
ing and verifying a linear policy function in fact yields cu? (a) = ra + w¯? = ce (w¯?, a) (Shimer and
Werning, 2008, Proposition 1), so that dw¯da = 0. As shown in Appendix 4.A, the reservation wage is
then determined by
w¯? = b+
α
γr
∫ ∞
w¯?
[1 + u (w − w¯?)] dF (w) (> b). (5)
Implicit differentiation proves that w¯? decreases uniformly in the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute
risk aversion at all wealth levels, ∂w¯
?
∂γ < 0. Analogously to the previous section, w¯
? > b implies −a > x
for all x > 0 with positive probability. Lower bounds on wealth and consumption require optimal
consumption to be non-linear and turn the reservation wage into a function of wealth.
To prove this assertion, consider again the evolution of optimal consumption (see Appendix 4.B):
c˙u = −α
γ
∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[
1− u
′ (ce (a,w))
u′ (cu (a))
]
dF (w) . (6)
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Using u′(c) = −γu(c) and ce = ra+ w in (6), consumption is constant on
cu0(a) = ra+ (u)
−1
(∫ ∞
w¯(a)
u (w)
dF (w)
1− F (w¯(a))
)
, (7)
i.e. if the instantaneous income from benefits and dissaving (b − a˙ = cu − ra) equals the certainty
equivalent of the lottery over future wages. Consumption is also constant on the a˙ = 0 locus, which
remains unchanged.
Proposition. Suppose a ≥ a¯ ≡ − br and c ≥ 0. Then, consumption, wealth, and the reservation wage
are strictly declining over the unemployment spell until the stationary point (c, a) = (0, a¯) is reached.
The reservation wage (which is increasing in wealth) exceeds the unemployment benefits at all wealth
levels.
The proof is in Appendix 4.C. To interpret this finding, notice that an increase in unemployment
benefits raises cu? one-by-one (∂c
u?
∂w¯?
∂w¯?
∂b = 1). With sufficient liquidity, unemployment benefits provide a
strong incentive to remain unemployed, waiting for better offers. Limited access to borrowing mitigates
this “benefit-to-mouth” effect and increases the need to accept a job as wealth declines.
3 Conclusion
We solved a sequential job search model with savings and CARA preferences without resorting to
unlimited borrowing and real-valued consumption. In the benchmark case where a, c ∈ R, consumption
is linear and changes in unemployment benefits and absolute risk aversion affect consumption equally
at all wealth levels. Holding absolute risk aversion constant, limited borrowing mitigates the impact
of unemployment benefits on current consumption, and leads to a declining sequence of reservation
wages over the unemployment spell.
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4 Appendix
4.A Optimal Behavior
The value function of an employed worker is rV e(a) = maxce {u(ce) + [ra+ w − ce]V e′(a)}. The
f.o.c. reads u′ (ce) = V e′ (a) . The “educated guesses” ceg = γ0a + γ1 and V eg (a) = γ2u(ceg)
solve the f.o.c. and the HJB equation if γ0γ2 = 1 and rγ0 = 1 − [(r − γ0)a+ w − γ1] γ2.
As wealth drops out for γ0 = r, ce = ra + w and V e =
u(ce)
r (a naturally exceeds
the lowest admissible wealth level). If a, c ∈ R, the unemployed’s HJB equation ρV u =
maxcu
{
u(cu) + (ra+ b− cu)V u′(a) + α ∫∞0 max[V e(a,w)− V u(a), 0]dF (w)} and f.o.c., V e = u(ce)r ,
and V e(w¯, a) ≡ V u(a) analogously verify cu = κ0a + κ1, V u(a) = κ2u(cu(a)) for κ0 = 1κ2 = r
and κ1 = w¯?. Substituting these expressions and the f.o.c. in the HJB equation delivers (5).
4.B Evolution of Optimal Consumption
Substituting u′ (cu) = V u′ (a) in the unemployed’s HJB equation, differentiating, and using the f.o.c.,
r = ρ, and −α [V e (a, w¯ (a))− V u (a)] w¯′ (a) = 0 gives
[ra+ b− cu (a)]V u′′ (a) = −α
∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[
V e′ (a,w)− V u′ (a)] dF (w) . (A.1)
Differentiating V u′(a) using the Change of Variable Formula (CVF, cf. Sennewald and Wa¨lde, 2006,
Sennewald, 2007a,b, Wa¨lde, 2008, Øksendal, 2003) and canceling 1− F (w¯(a)) yields
dV u′ (a) = V u′′ (a) dau +
[∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[
V e′ (a,w)− V u′ (a)] dF (w)] dqα
where dqα is the increment of the Poisson process. Substituting with the f.o.c.’s in both employment
states, dau = (ra + b − cu)dt, and using the resulting expression in (A.1) (dqα = 0 for an individual
who does not find a job), we get
du′ (cu) = −α
∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[
u′ (ce)− u′ (cu)] dF (w) dt. (A.2)
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Let υ ≡ (u′(cu))−1 such that dυ = dcu. Applying the CVF to υ yields dυ((u′(c)) =
υ′(u′(c))du′(cz(a))dt + [υ (u′(cu))− υ (u′(ce))] dqα. Using dυ = dcu, υ′ = u′′ (cu (a))−1, dqα = 0, and
du′ (cu) from (A.2), we find c˙u = − αu′′(cu)
∫∞
w¯(a) [u
′ (ce)− u′ (cu)] dF (w). Inserting u′′ (cu) = −γu′ (cu)
and u
′(ce)
u′(cu) = −u (ce − cu) gives (3).
4.C Proof of the Proposition
In three steps. (a) cu0 (a) > ζa (a) and hence c˙
u (a) < 0, a˙u < 0 for all a > a¯; (b) cu(a) > ra + b
implies ce (a, w¯ (a)) > cu (a); (c) w¯(a) > b.
(a) follows from i) cu (a) 6= ra + b for a > a¯ and ii) cu (a) > ra + b, c˙u (a) < 0, and a˙u < 0
for a slightly above a¯ since cu0 (a¯) > ζa (a¯) = 0. i) If c
u(a′) = ra′ + b, a˙u = 0 and thus c˙u(a′) = 0.
Then, (7) implies u′(b) <
∫∞
b u
′(w)dF (w)
1−F (b) , a contradiction since (6) requires equality if c˙
u = 0. ii)
cu (a¯) = 0 since cu (a) ≥ 0 and cu (a¯) > 0 implies a˙u < 0 at a = a¯. From cu (a¯) = 0 and (4),
w¯ (a¯) >,=, < b if and only if w¯′ (a¯) >,=, < b. w¯ (a¯) < b violates a ≥ a¯. By assumption, F ′ (w) > 0
for some w > w¯ (a¯). Hence, u′′ < 0 and (7) imply
∫∞
w¯(a¯) u
′(w¯(a¯)−b)dF (w)
1−F (w¯(a¯)) >
∫∞
w¯(a¯) u
′(w−b)dF (w)
1−F (w¯(a¯)) = u
′ (cu0 (a¯)).
Accordingly, u′ (w¯ (a¯)− b) > u′ (cu0 (a¯)) so that, from u′′ < 0 and w¯(a¯) ≥ b, cu0 (a¯) > w¯ (a¯) − b ≥ 0.
Hence, cu0 (a¯) > ζa (a¯). Continuity of c
u
0 (a) and the instability of c
u
0 (a) and ζa (a) complete the proof.
(b) Since the c˙u = 0 locus is unstable, and a˙u < 0 is implied by cu (a) > ra + b, we have
cu (a) < cu0 (a). u
′′ < 0 thus yields u′ (cu (a)) > u′ (cu0 (a)) =
∫∞
w¯(a) u
′(ce(a,w))dF (w)
1−F (w¯(a)) . This implies
u′ (cu (a)) [1− F (w¯ (a))] > ∫∞w¯(a) u′ (ce (a,w)) dF (w) > ∫∞w¯(a) u′ (ce (w¯ (a) , a)) dF (w), i.e. u′ (cu (a)) >
u′ (ce (w¯ (a) , a)).
(c) w¯(a¯) ≥ b (from the proof of (a)), (4), and (b) imply w¯(a) > b for a > a¯. Suppose w¯ (a¯) = b.
Then, V e(w¯, a) = V u(a) and V e(w, a) = u(ra+w)r imply rV
u (a¯) = u (0). Substituting this in the
maximized HJB equation of the unemployed evaluated at a¯ using cu (a¯) = 0 (see (a)) and ρ = r
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gives
∫∞
b [V
e (w, a¯)− V u (a¯)] dF (w) ∫∞b [1 + u (w − b)] dF (w) = 0, a contradiction since F ′ (w) > 0
for some w > b and u (0) = −1.
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